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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF CERTAIN
TERRITORY FROM HIGHLAND
TOWN

)
)
)

HIGHLAND TOWN,
)

Appellant,
)

vs.
GIBBONS REALTY COMPANY,
et al.,

)

Case No. 18191

)

Respondents.
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF CASE
This is a statutory proceeding under 10-2-501 Utah Code Annotated 1953
for disconnection from Highland Town (now Highland City) of approximately
131 acres of real property.
LOWER COURT'S DISPOSTION OF CASE
Following a trial,

the court ordered (R. 159) that the property be

disconnected, that neither party was to pay to the other any sum as a result
of the disconnection (except that the petitioners were to pay property taxes
prorated to the date of the order of disconnection),

that Highland Town

should file with the Secretary of State and the Utah County Recorder
appropriate amendments to the articles of incorporation, and that certain costs
were to be borne by the petitioners.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the order of the disconnection.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Highland Town was incorporated in August 1977 (R. 196).

Included in

the incorporated area was a rectangle owned by the petitioners on the eastern
edge

of ·a peninsula

Petitioners 1

property

extending

east of

the main

contained

approximately

portion of the city.

131 acres

of

a

total

of

approximately 2,142 acres witJ?.in the city (R. 65).
On June 2, 1978, this proceeding was initiated by the owners of all of
the property in the 131 acre area, viz. , Utah Power and Light Company,
Gibbons Realty Company, John K. Hayes, Lillian Y. Hayes, David R. Hayes,
Gerny J. Hayes, Robert D. Hayes, and Virginia D. Hayes.
A number of facts were established by the terms of a pretrial order
entered on February 11, 1980:

the description of the property sought to be

disconnected ("the territory");

Highland City has no sewer system; the

territory is part of a peninsula extending east of the remainder of Highland
City; all of the described territory has been zoned by Highland City as
residential property, but none of it has been used as such; the petitioners
are all of the property owners within the described territory; there are no
registered voters or any other persons living within the territory; and
disconnection of the territory will not effect the ability of the City to pro vi.de
police protection or fire protection to other areas of the City (R. 65-66).
Evidence was presented to the court respecting the various factors set
out in 10-2-503 Utah Code Annotated 1953, including projected streets or
public

ways,

water

mains

and

water

services,

sewer mains and sewer

services, law enforcement, zoning, other municipal services, and whether or

- 2 -
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not the disconnection would result in islands or unreasonably large or varied
shape peninsular land masses.

Existing or Projected
Streets or Public Ways
The only public roads in the territory are State Road 92 and State
Road 146, both of which are maintained by the State of Utah.

There is a

dirt road established and maintained on its own property by Utah Power and
Light Company (TR. 68-71).

Except for the state roads, the only access to

the Gibbons Realty Company property is by way of a road that runs in the
direction of Alpine City then turns to the east and into the Gibbons Realty
property from the north, but this route is a long one, exceeding ten miles
(R. 295),

and

would

require

(R. 218).

The only feasible access to the property of Gibbons Realty is from

the state road (R. 216-217).

crossing

other

privately owned

property

There was no evidence presented as to any

projected streets or public ways within or to the area.
Water Mains and Water Services
Highland City does not have a water system.

Residents of the city are

supplied water by Highland Water Company without any involvement by the
city (R. 272).

From the water system there are no laterals that would serve

the property owned by Gibbons Realty (R. 240), and there was no evidence
of any laterals to serve property owned by the other petitioners within the
territory.

After this proceeding was initiated, some additional plans were

projected for the Highland Water Company system,

but even under the

projected plans, at least half of the property in the territory could not be
served (R. 428).

One of the petitioners, Gibbons Realty Company, developed
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its own water supply in the form of a well costing approximately $100, 000.
At the time the well was commenced, the company did not know of the plan to
incorporate Highland Town (R. 201-202).
Sewer Mains and Sewer Services
At the time the proceeding was commenced, and as of the date of the
pretrial order, Highland City had no sewer system (R. 65), and most of the
city's residents are dependent upon septic tanks for disposal of sewage.-Subsequent to initiation of the proceeding, Highland City tied into a sewer
system developed by the Timpanogos Region (R. 272), but the tie-in is on
the west side of the city, remote from the territory (R. 273).

Money for the

tie-in was committed after the petition was filed (R. 429), and the main would
have run to the school whether or not the petitioners' property was to be in
the city (R. 375).
Law Enforcement
The Utah County Sheriff is the Highland City Marshall, and his deputies
are assistant town marshalls.

They supply law enforcement services to

Highland City under a contract, Highland City having no police force of its
own (R. 266).

The duties of the sheriff and his deputies are about the same

as they were before the town was incorporated.

A deputy sheriff works

contemporaneously as a deputy and a person on contract with Highland City,
patrolling a particular area (R. 397).
Zoning
There was much testimony by officers and residents of Highland City
that one of the main reasons for keeping the territory within the city was to
prevent the operation of a gravel pit in the territory,

and there was

testimony that municipalities prefer to control the uses to which nearby

- 4 -
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property is put, but there is no evidence that the zoning of the property in
question would be changed if returned to the jurisdiction of Utah County.
Even

if

the territory were disconnected,

the possibility of any of the

petitioners having a gravel operation approved is not good (R. 387).
property is zoned residential,

The

as is virtually all of the property within

Highland City, but the territory is not suitable for residential use and there
is no residential development in it (R. 291).

The territory is remote from the

Timpanogos Region sewer area and the municipal sewer lines and much of the
area is not suitable for , septic tanks (Exhibit 15), which would be necessary
for residential use.

The lower area of the Gibbons Realty property would not

be suitable for residences (R. 391).

There are no houses or other buildings

on the property (R. 255), and it is unlikely that anyone would build a
residence on that part of the property lying next to State Road 92 (R. 263).
Other Municipal Services
Highland City has no fire department.

It obtains its fire protection

services under con tract with the City of Alpine, and receives some fire
protection services from American Fork (R. 263).

There are no fire hydrants

in the area, and in the event of fire, the fire departments would have to use

pumpers.

The main responsibility of the contracted fire departments is to

fight grass and brush fires (R. 264).

The condition of the roads are such

that Alpine is unable to furnish effective fire protection for part of the
property lying south of the junction of State Road 92 and State Road 146
(R. 356).
Garbage
residents

disposal is handled by a private company with whom the

deal directly.

The city provides no garbage disposal service

(R. 274).

- 5 -
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There are no sidewalks in the area and no subdivisions (R. 274).

The

city map submitted at trial shows that no subdivisions have been platted in
the area.
The map attached to the petition and the maps introduced in evidence
show that there would be no islands or peninsular masses created by the
disconnection of the property in question.

By virtue of the disconnection,

the city's east side will be less peninsular, rather than more.
The loss of revenue from the elimination of taxable property would be
insignificant.

Exhibits 5 and 6 show the minimal taxes that were paid on the

property other than that of Utah Power and Light Company for the purposes
of Highland City.

The testimony of the Utah County Assessor in exhibit 9

established that the territory represents a very small fraction of the assessed
valuation of the property in Highland City (R. 247-250).
The evidence also established that the territory is not needed for the
future

growth ·of Highland City.

Since its incorporation,

the city has

annexed additional territory and now has approximately twice the acreage it
had at the time of incorporation.

Its population has increased from seven or

eight hundred in August of 1977 to about two thousand five hundred at the
time of trial (R. 276).

The "Official Utah County Master Plan Series Land

Use Element," Exhibit 14, suggests that eight persons per acre is an optimum
number for a city.

At eight persons per acre Highland City, with its present

acreage, would be able to accommodate a population of over 30, 000.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL EVIDENCE
RELEVANT TO ITS DETERMINATION OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO
DISCONNECTION.

- 6 -
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The court, on evidence with respect to which there was no substantial
dispute, found that the only streets in the territory were two highways
maintained by the State of Utah, and private ways created and maintained by
property owners; that there were no publicly owned and operated water mains
or water services or sewer mains or sewer services extending to, traversing
upon or planned in any manner to connect to the territory within the
reasonably forseeable future; that law enforcement in the territory exists to
the same extent as a part of Highland Town as it did, or upon disconnection
would; that zoning restrictions now existing on the land probably would be
essentially the same upon disconnection; that disconnection of the territory
would not result in islands or unreasonably large or varied shaped peninsular
land masses; that the territory is considered by town officials to be a future
location for a water pressure tank and water mains to traverse from the city's
projected water sources into town; that city officials consider the territory to
be suitable for a park or a cemetery, or both, but no master plan has
officially set aside for development of any of these areas for such future
uses;

that

constructed

since initiation of this action sewer outfall lines have been
in

territory nor is

Highland

Town,

but no laterals have extended into the

there any plan to take them into the territory in any

particular location; that fire protection provided to Highland Town is under
contract with the City of Alpine, and disconnection would eliminate contractual
responsibility for the area in question and diminish the expense of such
protection; that commissioners were duly appointed and held a public hearing;
and that there was no basis for either the petitioners paying any sum to
Highland Town or Highland Town paying any sum to the petitioners as a
result of the disconnection, except that the petitioners should pay taxes for
the current year, prorated as of the date of the final order of disconnection.

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On the basis of its findings of fact the court entered the following
conclusions of law:
1.
Disconnection of the territory will not leave the
municipality with a residual area within its boundary for which the
costs, requirements, or other burdens of municipal service would
materially increase over previous years over which it would become
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a
municipality, and disconnection will not result in islands or
unreasonably large or varied shaped peninsular land masses within
or projecting into the boundaries of Highland Town.
Justice and equity require
2.
disconnected from the municipality.
3.

that

the

territory

be

The allegations of the petition are true.

4.
The petitioners are en titled to an order disconnecting the
territory from Highland City.
5.
There should be no financial contribution either way
between Highland Town and the property owners in the territory to
be disconnected, except that taxes for the current year should be
prorated as of the date of the final order of disconnection.
It thus appears that the court considered all of the factors enumerated

in the statute.

The city, however, relies upon two statutory clauses as a

basis for its argument that the court did not consider all of the factors that
should have been considered in making its determination.

The first is a part

of paragraph (3) of 10-2-501 U. C. A. 1953:
The officers of the municipality, or any person interested in
the subject matter of the petition may appear before the court and
contest the granting of the petition for disconnection by presenting
the evidence as they deem relevant. [Emphasis added.]
The other is a clause in 10-2-503 that the court shall consider

11

among.

other factors" the effect of the disconnection on streets, public ways, water
mains, water services, sewer mains and sewer services. law enforcement,
zoning,

and

other

municipal

services,

and

the

configuration

of

municipality after the territory is removed.

- 8 -
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the

Relying on those sections, Highland City attempted to transform this
disconnection case in to a zoning case.
Latching onto some isolated wording, the city is asking this court to
construe 10-2-502 and 10-2-503 as if there were no standards at all for
disconnection of property from a municipality, and that the court is required
to take into account any matter that anybody "deems relevant," regardless of
that person's interest in, or the matter's relation to, the case, and that the
court must also consider factors which have nothing to do with municipal
services or the practicality of the municipality continuing to function as such
if territory is disconnected from it.

In urging this construction, the city is

disregarding well-established rules of statutory construction.
The first rule it casts aside is the one announced in Cannon v.
McDonald,

615 P. 2d

1268,

1270

(Utah 1980),

that

"in

interpreting

the

statutory language, care must be taken to construe the words used in light of
the total context of the legislation."

The second is that of noscitur a sociis,

to the effect that the meaning of terms may be derived from the company they
keep, the basis of which was pointed out in Heathman y. Giles, 13 Utah2d

368, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (1962):
Where there is doubt or uncertainty as to the interpretation of
a statute there are two well known rules of statutory construction
which are helpful. The rule of noscitur a sociis, literally "it is
known from its associates," requires that the meaning of doubtful
words or phrases be determined in the light of and take their
character from associated words or phrases. Sutherland in his
treatise on Statutory Construction states:
"* * * Where two or
more words are grouped together and ordinarily have a similar
meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general words will
be limited and qualified by the special words."
The court also discussed the rule of ejusdem generis, also rejected by

.

the city, and explained the basis of the two rules:
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Another closely related rule which is universally accepted as
valid is that of ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same kind, n which
rule is that: when general words or terms follow specific ones, the
general must be understood as applying to things of the same kind
as the specific .
These are, of course, neither artifical nor arbitrary rules but
arise quite naturally from the process of reasoning as to what the
statute was intended to mean. Common sense and experience teach
that when a group of related things are specifically enumerated, the
mind is focused upon that class of things, and that the addition of
general terms is proposed to avoid inadvertent omission and to
include like things of the same class . In accord with this is the
fact that if the broadest meaning of the general expression were
intended, it would have been sufficient by itself without any use of
the specific terms .
Citing Lyman

~·

Town of Bow Mar, 553 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1975), the city

takes the position that the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply because the
11

among other things" precedes, rather than follows, the particular words.

The Colorado court did so state in a case in which the general words used
had well accepted meanings; and it is also true that the rule of ejusdem
generis is generally stated as applying to general terms that follow specific
ones.

But this is probably because many statutes are written in just that

way, and courts recognize that the rule of ejusdem generis is but a particular
application of the rule of noscitur a sociis.

It is the association of the words

that is important, not whether the general term precedes or follows the
particular terms .
In Application of Central Airlines, 185 P. 2d 919, 923 ( Okl. 1947), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma was faced with the construction of a statute
where the general term, "shall include" preceded the particular terms defining
"transportation company."

The court said:

By the rule of construction known as "ejusdem generis," as
declared in Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County v. Grimes,
75 Okl. 219, 182 P. 897, "General words do not explain or amplify

- 10 -
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particular terms preceding them, but are themselves restricted and
explained by the particular terms."
This rule has no literal
application in the instant case where the general words precede
those of specification.
But it does not follow that the same
principle does not apply where, manifestly, the specific words have
reference to the same subject matter as that of the general words.
That it does so apply is declared in 59 C. J. 980, as follows :
"So words of general import in a statute are limited by words
of restricted import immediately following and relating to the same
subject."
The underlying authority for such application is to be found in
the ancient and generally accepted rule of construction known as
"Noscitur A Sociis" (46 C.J. 496 and cases there cited) which,
according to Broom's Legal Maxims, means:
"The meaning of a
doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of
words associated with it."
In discussing the maximum "ejusdem generis" the Supreme
Court of Florida, in Ex Parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 12 So. 289, 293,
following numerous cases cited therein, declared:
"The maxim is a mere specific application of the broader maxim
'noscitur a sociis, 1 'which means that general and specific words
which are capable of an analogous meaning being associated together
take color from each other, so that the general words are restricted
to a sense analogous to the less general. 11
See also 82 C. J. S. , Statutes, §§ 331 and 332, and 14 Words and Phrases
(Penn. Ed.), pp. 191 et seq.
The "among other factors" language appears in 10-2-503, the full text of
which is as follows:
The court for the purposes of determining whether or not
territory shall be disconnected shall consider whether or not
disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual area within
its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens
of municipal services would materially increase over previous years
or for which it would become economically or practically
unreasonable to administer as a municipality.
The court shall
consider, among other factors, the effect of the disconnection on
existing or projected streets or public ways, water main and water
services ' sewer mains and sewer services, law enforcement,
zoning
.
.
and other municipal services and whether or not the d1sconnect1on
will result in islands or unreasonably large or varied shaped
peninsular land masses within or projecting into the boundaries of
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected.
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The first sentence colors the section as a whole,

and indicates a

legislative intention to protect the city's continued existence, its ability to
grow, and its ability to continue to perform the services for its inhabitants
even

though

part

of its

territory may

be

taken

away.

The factors

enumerated are those that would have an effect upon the "cost, requirements,
or other burdens of municipal services," and suggest that the "other factors"
should also be factors that have an effect upon the economics and practicality
of continuing to administer the area as a municipality.
The court made findings of fact with respect to the configuration of the
city after disconnection of the territory; streets and highways, existing and
projected; water main and water services; sewer mains and sewer services;
law enforcement; and zoning, being all of the factors enumerated in 10-2-503.
It also made findings with respect to ideas of town officials respecting future

development of the property; fire protection; and possible development of a
water system and the establishment of park or cemetery.
The city argues, however, that the court should have taken into account
e:very factor that the city or those speaking for it "deemed relevant" to the
proceeding.

The court interpreted the statute as requiring it to hear all of

the evidence that the city wished to produce, but as not requiring the court,
itself, to attribute relevance to such evidence.

This makes sense.

It is

reasonable for the legislature to permit a city to introduce a wide range of
information,

with

the

thought

that

by

not

severely

restricting

the

presentation of evidence, there may be matters presented to the court which
will be relevant to the disconnection.

But that is not the same as requiring

the trial court to deem the evidence relevant, when it is apparent that it is
based upon mistaken ideas and unsubstantiated fears.
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In its brief the city argues that the following factors should have been
given weight by the trial court in determining whether "equity and justice"
required disconnection :
1.

The opinion of the Mayor that disconnection of the territory

would hamper the city in carrying out its responsibilities for the peace,
health,

and safety of its residents,

that water and air quality would be

adversely effected and that the homeowners had made investments to preserve
their home,s "from degradation and anything else that might happen."

This in

the face of other testimony that disconnection itself would have no such
effect. The Mayor was not talking about the effect of disconnection, but the
effect of a particular use of the property if, at some future date, the zoning
authority permitted such use.

But, as the trial court recognized, this was

not an issue in this disconnection case.
2.

In

August 1979,

after

this

proceeding

was

initiated,

the city

entered into a lease agreement with Utah Power and Light Company under
which the power company leased a portion of its property to the city at $1. 00
a year and gave the city an option to purchase it.

Existence of the lease

was then used by the city as the foundation for an argument that the Utah
Power

and

Light

Company

property

disconnection would create an island.

would

be

part

of

the

city,

and

There may have been other valid

reasons for the lease, but the action has the appearance of manipulation.
3.

That Mr. Bagley of Gibbons and Reed Company had at one time told

the town council that the company desired to construct and operate a gravel
extraction plant and might later desire to include a cement batch plant and an
asphalt batch plant.

Again,

this has nothing to do with the question of

disconnection, since the right of the company to conduct such an operation
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would depend upon either establishing that right as a pre-existing use, or
obtaining proper zoning from the authorities, be they officers of Highland
City or Utah County, or some other political entity.
4.

A public opinion survey as to the type of environment and the

quality of life the citizens of Highland City desire.

As established by the

other evidence, however, the disconnection of a portion of the city would
have no effect upon the environment to be found-- within Highland City.

The

disconnection is a political matter that does not affect the physical uses or
appearance of the property in question.
5.

That one of the petitioners, J. Keith Hayes, testified that he and

his family had made an effort to get out of the lawsuit, and that they had
made an "overture" toward being released from the petition for disconnection.
True ·or not, the Hayeses never took any formal steps to remove their names
from the petition or

io

be dismissed from the proceeding, and it is doubtful

that they would have had a right to do so.

Moreover, cross examination of

Mr. Hayes indicated that the "overture" probably resulted from pressure put
upon him by the city.
Q.
I take it, Mr. Hayes, that since filing this petition you
have had some contacts by representatives of Highland City about
withdrawing from this petition?

A.

I have had a number of them, yes.

Several of them,

yes.
Q.
It has been suggested strongly to you that that is
something you ought to do, has it not?

MR. MADSEN:
the question.

Let me object to the characterization of

THE COURT: Well, its cross examination, Mr. Madsen.
I '11 let him answer. You may answer Mr. Hayes .
MR. HAYES:

Yes.
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Q.
(By Mr. Roe) And who was it that contacted you first
do you recall?

A. I believe most of the contacts had been made by Mayor
LeBaron. Probably not all of them.
6.

That Utah Power and Light Company had no particular policy

relating to disconnection matters, and its officer signed the papers as an
accommodation.

But this does not relate to any of the factors that go to the

justice and equity of disconnecting the property from the city.

The evidence

as to city services and the effects of disconnection are the same regardless of
the motivation of one or more of the petitioners.
7.

The testimony of Virginia Mathis that she was bothered by trucks

going past her house.

This testimony relates to a condition that presently

exists in Highland City which is not the responsibility in any way of any of
the petitioners,

and could have no bearing upon the resolution of the

disconnection question despite the fact that she believes that if there is a
disconnection there may be more trucks .
8.

The testimony of Gordon Buckley Rose, a Utah County planner,

that the county would have great difficulty in providing services if the
territory were "de-annexed."

Although he made this general statement, the

only example he gave was the problem of fire engines turning the corner
where State Highways 92 and 146 converge, which is the same problem that
Highland City already has.
9.

Rejection of the testimony of the Mayor of North Salt Lake.

The

proffered testimony was the opinion of the Mayor as to the desirability of
having gravel operations within the town rather than have them outside and
not subject to the town's control.

This was opinion testimony that had no
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bearing on the question of the disconnection of property from Highland City.
It represents nothing more than a personal preference of a witness who had

no interest in the particular proceeding.
10.

The extent to which Gibbons and Reed Company, if permitted to do

so, might extract and haul sand and gravel along the state highway.

While

this might have an effect upon the question of the zoning of the Gibbons
Realty Company property, it has nothing to do with the disconnection.

As

testified by Mr. Rose, the county planner, the possibility of one of the
petitioners getting a gravel operation upon disconnection from Highland City
was "not good. "
11.

The Mayors of the city and of the intervening cities of Alpine,

Pleasant Grove, and Linden were of the opinion that there would be an
advantage for the property in question remaining under Highland City's
control.

No justification was given for this opinion, and it is difficult to see

its relevance to the question of disconnecting the property.
The trial court heard virtually all of the evidence that the city and the
in tervenors wanted to present.

After it was presented, however, the trial

court was required to make a judgment as to whether the evidence was
material to the disconnection issue in light of the factors set out in the
statute.

The trial court attempted to make a judgment as to the effect of

disconnection upon the municipality and on its ability to continue offering the
services

that it was obligated to offer as a municipality.

determination,

It made that

and made it on the basis of objective evidence as to the

consequences of disconnection.

The city, however, would have the court

regard the proceeding as one in which the desires of the residents of the city

.

should be controlling, in other words, that the proceeding should be a matter
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of choosing up

sides -- majority wins.

Such a construction would raise

serious constitutional issues.

II

THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT JUSTICE
REQUIRE DISCONNECTION OF THE TERRITORY.

AND

EQUITY

One of the criteria established by 10-2-502 Utah Code Annotated 1953 for
disconnection of territory from a municipality is that it shall be required by
"justice and equity."
"justice

and

equity,"

The statute does not attempt to define what constitutes
but

this

court

has

recognized

that

there

is

a

relationship between "justice and equity" and the criteria set out in 10-2-503.
In In the Matter of the Disconnection of Territory and Restriction of the
Corporate Limits of the City of Draper, Utah,

decided· by this court on

April 27, 1982, but not yet reported, the court said:
The
substantive
criteria
for
determining
whether
a
disconnection should be ordered are set out in Utah Code Ann. ,
1953, §10-2-502 and §10-2-503. The former provides that a decree
of disconnection should be granted if required by "justice and
equity." Whether the general standard of "justice and equityn has
been met in a particular case turns in large measure on the facts .
In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co. , 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044
0928). The varied circumstances of each disconnection case do not
allow for exact and clear-cut criteria. However, the legislature in
§10-2-503 has established more specific criteria which are relevant
in determining whether a disconnection would be consistent with
justice and equity and sound principles of city planning. That
section provides:
10-2-503. Criteria for disconnection. The court for
the purposes of determining whether or not territory
should be disconnected shall consider whether or not
disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual
area within its
boundaries for which the cost,
requirements, or other burdens of municipal services
would materially increase over previous years or for
which it would be economically or practically unreasonable
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to administer as a municipality.
The court should
consider, among other factors, the effect of the
disconnection on existing or projected streets or public
ways, water mains and water services, sewer mains and
sewer services, law enforcement, zoning and other
municipal services and whether or not the disconnection
will result in islands or unreasonably large or
varied-shaped peninsular land masses within or projecting
into the boundaries of the municipality from which the
territory is to be disconnected.
Prior to 1971, the specific criteria for disconnection were not included in
the statute.
Previously

They were added by Chapter 10, § 1, Laws of Utah 1971.

"justice and equity" had been the only statutorily prescribed

criteria.
Nevertheless, this court had applied factors very much like those now
appearing in 10-2·503, recognizing that "justice and equity" are related to the
ability of the city to continue to carry on its functions in a reasonable
manner after disconnection of territory.
In In re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 2d 468 (1935), the court reversed
a disconnection decree on procedural grounds, but in doing so discussed one
factor that might be considered in determining "justice and equity," saying:
The mere fact that the town of Moab would lose its income
heretofore derived from the taxation of the land in question does
not justify the refusal of petitioner's application to have his land
segregated from the town.
The case was tried again, and again the court held that the property
should be disconnected.

Again the city appealed,

and in Application of

Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937) the court listed some of the
criteria to be considered in determining whether to disconnect territory from
a municipality.

Upholding the trial court's disconnection decree, this court

said:
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* * * The land is located on the western boundary of the
town; it is agricultural in character; has never been used for any
other purpose than to raise hay and other fann products; it has no
residents on it except a small shack erected without permission of
the owner. The town has a sewer system and waterwork system,
both of which have been constructed and the indebtedness to pay
for the same incurred since the petition for severance was filed.
The sewer is located at too high an elevation to serve any part of
the severed land. City water is available to the land but it can be
more conveniently served from a privately owned system, the
pipeline of which goes through it, and in which the petitioner is a
large owner. The nearest fire hydrant maintained by the town is
about a mile distant. The land is about a mile from the business
section of the town.
There is no paving or sidewalk or other
improvements abutting or near the land, although it abuts on an
abandoned state highway which is now being maintained by the
town.
Power and light services are available, but these are
furnished by a private concern and not by the town government.
In Kennecott Copper Corporation

~.

City of Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah2d

60, 415 P . 2d 209 ( 1966) , this court had occasion to take another look at the
material factors.

The court said:

In the disconnected area there are no dwellings, no
inhabitants, and there is no reasonable prospect of any such use in
the future.
The City has heretofore furnished police and fire
protection, waste and garbage collection, sewage disposal facilities,
and has maintained roads and streets. The plaintiff contends that
because no one lives in that area there will be no disadvantage to
the loss of these services; and that the necessary extension of its
mining operations has been seriously hampered because of various
factors, including the city's requirements relating to zoning
regulations and construction permits.
The decree of disconnection was upheld despite the fact that the city
expected to lose about $28, 000 a year in sales and use taxes.

In discussing

the meaning of "justice and equity, 11 the court said that the facts of each
case

must,

to

a

very

large

extent,

determine

that

question,

determining that question the court noted that there was no

11

and

in

interdependent

relationship" between the property in question and the city of such a nature
as to warrant denial of the petition .
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After its decision in Kennecott Copper, the court decided In The Matter
of The Disconnection of Territory from Layton City, 27 Utah2d 241, 494 P. 2d
948 (1972).

The decision of the trial court disconnecting the territory was

upheld by this court, which said:
At the time of pretrial some issues of fact were agreed to by
the parties as follows: (1) There are no improvements or buildings
upon the territory sought to be disconnected and the only road is
an unimproved county road on the easterly boundary of the land;
( 2) Layton City provides no water, garbage service or sewer
service to the territory; ( 3) The nearest city waterline is
approximately 400 feet from the boundary of the petitioner's
property; ( 4) The city provides fire protection to the territory;
(5) That 'the part of the petitioner's property lying outside the
boundaries of the city is being developed by the petitioner and East
Layton Town is providing sewer and water service to that part of
the tract.
In addition to the stipulated facts,

the trial court on the basis of

evidence produced at the hearing, made the following findings:
that topography of the petitioner's entire tract of land made it
desirable that the subject property be developed as a part of the
entire parcel for residential purposes and that the territory prior to
the commencement of these proceedings was unimproved and
uninhabited and had not been used for other than agricultural
purposes .
The court also found there were no city streets,
improvements or buildings within the territory and that the city
supplied no substantial municipal services to the area. The court
further found that the city will not suffer substantial loss of tax
revenue, nor will its municipal functions be in any substantial way
effected or impaired by the disconnection.
Based upon these
findings the court concluded that justice and equity required that a
decree be entered disconnecting the territory in question from
Layton City.
On the basis of those admitted and established facts, this court upheld
the decree of disconnection.
Disconnection was also decreed, and the decree upheld, in Howard v.
Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah2d 278, 323 P. 2d 261 (1958).

The findings

supporting the decree were that the town had been organized primarily to
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provide a culinary water system; that the town had spent substantial money
to acquire and develop the water supplies, but no part of the facilities
extended into the area disconnected; that there were no houses in the area;
that the only structures were those used by industrial facilities; that there
were no sidewalks, curbs or gutters; that none of the property had been
planted or subdivided for residential development; that the two principal
roads in the area were maintained by the State of Utah and Davis County;
that one of the plaintiffs, Salt Lake Refining Company, constructed its own
road from the public streets of Salt Lake City to its plant; no water was
being furnished to any industry or person within the disconnected area; that
North Salt Lake would be able to furnish Salt Lake Refining Company water
for culinary purposes but not for its industrial requirements; that the town
had no fire fighting facilities; that its town marshall worked one shift per day
but did no patrolling within the refinery area; that no garbage removal was
conducted

by

the

town

within

the

disconnected

area;

and

disconnection would not destroy the symmetry of its boundaries.

that

the

See also, In

re Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, 262 P. 105 (1927); In re Fullmer, 33 Utah
43, 92 P. 768 (1907); and Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455,
243 P. 376 (1926).
There are two Utah cases in which disconnection petitions were denied,
in whole or in part, and the denial was upheld by this court.

Re Chief Consolidated Mining Co. , 71 Utah 430, 266 P.
Continental Bank and Trust Company
(Utah 1979).

~·

They are In

1044 (1928), and

Farmington City, 599 P. 2d 1242

In both of these cases the petition for disconnection was denied

because of the interdependence of the territory and of the municipality.

In

the first case, there was a close relationship between the mining activities
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and the municipal services being provided within the city, and in the second
case there was a close relationship between the city's providing of police and
security forces, culinary water, and traffic control, and the need for the city
to respond to emergencies in an amusement park.

There was also evidence

that Farmington had become increasingly dependent upon the park for tax
revenues.

In both of the cases it appeared that disconnection would have a

very serious effect upon the remaining part of the municipality, and that the
municipality had committed itself and provided various services to the areas
within the territory.

The cases represent a fairly common view as expressed

by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb.
520, 118 N. W. 127, as follows:

***

The test of whether "justice and equity" requires such
disconnection is whether the land has a unity of interest with the
platted portion of the municipality and the maintenance of a
municipal government

* * *·

In the present case there is no symbiotic relationship between the
territory

and

the

remaining

parts

of

the

municipality,

interdependence, and there is no unity of interest.
whole,

there

is

no

The evidence, taken as a

indicates that the city's desire to retain the territory within the

boundaries of the municipality is based al.most entirely upon its desire to
control all future use of the property.

The property is remote from the

center of the city, it receives no substantial services from the city, it has no
residents, and it receives no benefit from being included within the city
limits.

The facts established at the trial closely parallel those in the many

cases in which this court has approved a finding that justice and equity
require that the territory be disconnected.

And, as this court stated in City

of Draper, supra:
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In ruling on a petition for disconnection, the trial court's
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
Kennecott Copper ~. y. City of Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah2d 60,
The burden is on the appellant to
415 P. 2d 209 (1966).
demonstrate that the trial court committed error, and not that
appellant should have won its case. We review the evidence, and
the inferences arising therefrom to favor the trial court's findings
of fact, Ovard y. Cannon, Utah, 600 P. 2d 1246 ( 1979); Rogers v.
Hansen, Utah, 580 P. 2d 233 ( 1978) .
III
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIGHLAND CITY'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL AND ITS MOTION
AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER.

ro

At the time the petition was filed in this proceeding, at the time of the
trial, at the time the court filed its memorandum decision on August 28, 1980,
at the time the commission met, and it is not known for how long thereafter,
the territory was on the eastern outskirts of the city.
During

the

pendency

of

the

proceeding,

the

city

negotiated with

Joseph A. Kjar respecting annexation by the city of the Kjar property which
lies to the east of the territory.

At the trial, Mr. Kjar testified that he had

talked with Mayor LeBaron about a possible annexation, indicating that he
desired to be included within the city, but was told by the Mayor that "this
action was pending, and that until it was resolved we couldn't very well move
completely on that request" (R. 378).
Nevertheless the city must have continued to talk with Mr. Kjar, and
before the formal findings of fact,

conclusions of . law, and decree were

entered, the city had annexed the Kjar property.

On this basis, the city

moved for a new trial, or for amendment of the findings, conclusions, and
decree on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

The court denied the

motion and its denial is assigned as error by Highland City.
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In numerous cases this court has announced and applied the rule that
the granting or denying of a motion for a new trial is a matter that lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the action of the trial
court will not be overturned unless it appears that the action was arbitrary
or that it clearly transgressed any reasonable bounds of discretion.

See Lee

v. Howes, 548 P. 2d 619, 621 (Utah 1976); Smith y. Shreeve, 551 P. 2d 1261,
1262 (Utah 1976); and--Page y. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 15 Utah2d
257, 391 P. 2d 290, 292 ( 1964).

Where a motion for a new trial is based upon

newly discovered evidence, the exercise of discretion by the trial court must
be based on a showing of substantial material evidence, from which it appears
there is at least a reasonable likelihood that it would affect the result in a
new trial.

Uptown Appliance and Radio Company v. Flint, 122 Utah 298,

249 P.2d 826, 828 (1952).
Although Rule 59 provides that when a new trial motion is made, the
court may open the judgment and take additional testimony, the motion to
reopen is also addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

See

Lewis y. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (1976).
The City regards the evidence as important because annexation of the
additional

80 acres

of

property

changed

the

configuration

of

the city,

resulting in an "unreasonable, large or varied-shaped peninsular land mass"
projecting into the boundaries of Highland City, or in creation of an island.
The possibility of such an annexation was presented during the trial when
Joseph A.

Kjar testified that he was interested in having his property

annexed by the city.

Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that the

receipt of this evidence upon reopening of the case would have resulted in a
different finding by the court.

Moreover, the evidence sought to be
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produced by Highland City is not "newly discovered evidence" within the
meaning of Rule 59.

In Patrick ~. Sedwick, 413 P. 2d 169, 177 (Alaska 1976),

a medical malpractice case, the defendant doctor contended on appeal that the
trial court had erred in denying his motion for a new trial which was based
on the ground that,

since the trial, there had been discovery of a new

medical technique which would have changed the prospects of the plaintiff and
would have reduced the amount of damages awarded.

The court set out the

general grounds for

the granting of a new trial on the basis of newly

discovered· evidence,

that it must be such as would probably change the

result on a new trial; must have been discovered since the trial; must be of
such a nature that it would have not been discovered before trial by due
diligence; must be material; and must not be merely culmative or impeaching.
In upholding the action of the trial court in denying the motion for a
new trial, the court observed:
In addition to the foregoing requirements, it is established
that for any evidence to come within the category of "newly
discovered" such evidence must relate to facts which were in
existence at the time of the trial.
See also Campbell

~.

American Foreign SS Corp. , 116 F. 2d 926, 928

(2 Cir. 1941), in which Judge Swan stated:

***

The facts alleged in support of the motion do not
constitute 1tnewly discovered evidence" within the rule.
That
phrase refers to evidence of facts in existence at the time of the
trial, of which the aggrieved party was excusably ignorant. If it
were ground for a new trial that facts occurring subsequent to the
trial have shown that the expert witnesses made an inaccurate
prophecy of the prospective disability of the plaintiff, the litigation
would never come to an end. The weight of authority is against
the granting of a new trial on the ground of u~expecte.d
improvement in the plaintiff's condition, unless the evidence is
sufficient to show fraud.
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See also 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.), 1f 59.08(3), p. 59-115.
In the present case the city has had in its power to make changes in the
facts,

and has done so on at least two occasions since the filing of the

petition.

In each case the changes in the facts, brought about by the city,

have been used as a basis for argument against disconnection.

First, prior

to trial, the city negotiated a lease with Utah Power and Light Company for
certain property lying within the territory to be disconnected, and sought to
establish that fact as a reason for not permitting the disconnection.
after

the

trial was

concluded,

and

apparently

after

Then,

all hearings

were

concluded, the city took steps to annex other property which would change
the boundaries to such an extent that it might argue, as it did in its motion
for a new trial and has on this appeal, that the trial should go for naught.
The case does not reach the standards of the Alaska case, cited above,
because the newly discovered evidence was not something that just happened,
but something that the city made happen.

The city's ability to "manage" the

evidence should not lead to a conclusion that "justice and equity" require that
the territory not be disconnected, nor does it show that enforcement of the
judgment would no longer be "equitable" if the motion is treated as one under
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
This action was fully and fairly tried.

Except for an opinion of the

Mayor of North Salt Lake, all of the evidence "deemed relevant'• by the city
and

by

the intervenors was listened to by the court.

But legislation

permitting the city to present such evidence as it deems to be relevant, does
not make it relevant.

If it did it would be impossible for a court to reach a

rational decision in a case of this type.

The city argues that the court in its
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memorandum decision indicated that the evidence with respect to the feelings
of the residents in Highland City, the hopes of the Mayor, and vague plans
for the future were not considered, but the court's language could also mean
that in light of the other evidence in the case these matters were not
sufficient to have a bearing upon the question of whether "justice and equity"
required disconnection of the territory.

This conclusion is consistent with

the many cases decided by this court under prior statutes, where "justice
and equity" was substantially the only criteria, and the present one, adopted
in 1971, in which the legislature has dilineated the factors that should be

taken into account by the court in determining whether "justice and equity"
require disconnection.
Although the legislation provides that the factors specifically enumerated
in 10-2-503 are not the only factors to be taken into consideration by the

court, rules of statutory construction require a holding that the statute,
properly construed, contemplates that the other factors to be taken into
account will be those that are similar to the ones enumerated, and that are
related to the question of whether or not

n disconnection

will leave the

municipality with a· residual area within its boundaries for which the cost,
requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase
over previous years or for which it would become economically or practically
unreasonable to administer as a municipality."

All the factors going to that

question were considered by the court and the court on the basis of the
evidence concluded that "justice and equity" did in fact require disconnection
of the territory from Highland City.
The motion for a new trial is based upon evidence which is not in fact
"newly discovered evidence" and which, because related evidence was
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produced at the trial, was not likely to change the result of the trial.

The

refusal to grant a new trial was not an abuse of the trial court's broad
discretion.
In light of the foregoing, the judgment and decree of the trial court
should be affirmed.

. Roe
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